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Obergefell’s Squandered Potential
Peter Nicolas*
Exactly two years to the day from its decision in United States v.
Windsor,1 declaring the federal government’s refusal to recognize stateauthorized same-sex marriages unconstitutional,2 the U.S. Supreme Court
dropped “the other shoe,” as Justice Scalia put it in his Windsor dissent.3 In
Obergefell v. Hodges,4 the Court declared unconstitutional state laws and
constitutional provisions barring same-sex couples from lawfully marrying in
the state or having their lawful out-of-state marriages recognized by the state.5
Obergefell was the fourth in a series of closely divided U.S. Supreme
Court opinions penned by Justice Kennedy over the past two decades that have
vindicated the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians. Obergefell was
preceded by the 1996 decision of Romer v. Evans,6 striking down Colorado’s
Amendment 2; the 2003 decision of Lawrence v. Texas,7 declaring sodomy
laws unconstitutional; and the 2013 decision of Windsor. As both the author
and often the deciding vote in each of these four cases, Justice Kennedy will no
doubt leave behind one of the most important gay rights legacies in U.S. legal
history. With each successive opinion, Justice Kennedy has steadily advanced
both the legal and political cause of gay rights in the United States.
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* William L. Dwyer Endowed Chair in Law and Adjunct Professor of Gender, Women, and
Sexuality Studies, University of Washington School of Law.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2. Id. at 2695–96.
3. Id. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
5. Id. at 2604–05.
6. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Despite Justice Kennedy’s unwavering support for gay rights, securing a
fifth vote in support of those rights after he retires is beyond the scope of his
powers. The closest substitute would be a clear, class-based equal protection
decision declaring sexual orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.
Such an opinion would secure an enduring precedent that would bind lower
courts—and within the bounds of stare decisis, Justice Kennedy’s successors—
when future laws targeting gays and lesbians are challenged. It would also
deter governmental actors from pursuing such actions in the first place,
knowing that the laws would be subject to a level of scrutiny they would not
likely survive. This heightened level of scrutiny would in turn give gays and
lesbians a measure of repose, affording them the same certainty that racial
minorities and women have that laws targeting them are unlikely to be upheld
by courts today.
Yet, despite having the opportunity in each of the four preceding gay
rights cases, Justice Kennedy declined to declare sexual orientation a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification. There were arguably sound procedural or
jurisprudential reasons for declining to do so in some of these cases, but in
others the path to deciding the case on such a ground was clear. In this sense,
Justice Kennedy squandered an important opportunity to leave a more enduring
gay rights legacy.
Romer v. Evans was the first case to present the Court with an opportunity
to declare sexual orientation discrimination a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification. At issue in the case was the constitutionality of Amendment 2 to
Colorado’s Constitution, a voter initiative that both repealed existing state and
local laws regarding non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
prohibited the future enactment of such laws.8 The Court declared Amendment
2 unconstitutional, but without purporting to apply anything greater than
rational basis scrutiny.9 Procedurally, it may have been awkward for the Court
to apply heightened equal protection scrutiny in Romer. The state trial court
had rejected the contention that sexual orientation was a suspect or quasisuspect classification, and those challenging Amendment 2’s constitutionality
had elected not to appeal that specific ruling within the state appellate court
system.10
Lawrence presented the Court with a more procedurally straightforward
opportunity to declare sexual orientation a suspect classification. Lawrence
addressed the constitutionality of a state sodomy law targeted solely at samesex sodomy. The Court explicitly granted certiorari on two alternative grounds:
substantive due process, which would require the Court to reconsider and

8.
9.
10.

Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24.
See id. at 631–36; see also id. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 n.3 (Colo. 1994), aff’d, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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overrule its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,11 or class-based equal
protection, since the law targeted only same-sex sodomy.12 In his decision for
the Court, Justice Kennedy acknowledged the Equal Protection Clause as a
tenable alternative basis for declaring the statute unconstitutional,13 but
declined to do so because that ground would lead some to “question whether a
prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct
both between same-sex and different-sex participants,” and Bowers’s
“continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”14 Justice
Kennedy was certainly correct that the continued existence of the Bowers
precedent was an impediment to gays and lesbians achieving equality. PreLawrence, lower courts frequently cited Bowers or the existence of lawful
sodomy laws to uphold laws denying gays and lesbians a whole host of rights.15
Yet, even if he felt compelled to address the due process claim and overrule
Bowers, Justice Kennedy could have also addressed the class-based equal
protection claim by following the example of Loving v. Virginia.16 There the
Court struck down miscegenation laws alternatively on the ground that they
violated the fundamental right to marry and the ground that they constituted
class-based discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.17
Justice Kennedy’s refusal to declare sexual orientation a suspect or quasisuspect classification is even harder to defend in the Court’s two marriage
cases. In Windsor, no procedural hurdles stood in the Court’s way yet Justice
Kennedy issued a murky opinion citing Romer and Lawrence along with
federalism principles to declare unconstitutional the federal government’s
refusal to recognize state-sanctioned same-sex marriages.18 And in Obergefell,
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion eschewed class-based equal protection
grounds. Instead, the Justice concluded that such laws interfered with the
fundamental right to marry19 protected by both the Fourteenth Amendment’s

11. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there is no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy,
and therefore Georgia’s sodomy statute did not violate such a right).
12. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
13. Id. at 574.
14. Id. at 575.
15. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102–03 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (public employment);
Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998) (child custody).
16. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
17. Although one could argue that a decision rendering a statute unconstitutional on alternative
constitutional grounds contravenes the Court’s canon of constitutional avoidance, that canon is
focused on minimizing friction with the political branches and requires courts to construe statutes to
avoid having to declare any conduct from the political branches unconstitutional. See Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190–91 (1991). Yet once the Court concludes that such a construction
is not possible, deciding the case on only one rather than multiple constitutional grounds does nothing
to further the underlying purpose of the canon.
18. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689–96 (2013); see also id. at 2696–97
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2705–07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.2584, 2602 (2015).
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Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.20 Even if Justice Kennedy felt it
necessary to reach the fundamental rights claim in Obergefell and overrule the
Court’s summary dismissal of such a claim in Baker v. Nelson,21 he could again
have followed the Loving example and rendered a decision declaring the statute
unconstitutional on both substantive due process and class-based equal
protection grounds.
To be sure, the Court has historically proceeded incrementally before
declaring a classification suspect or quasi-suspect, often first applying a more
aggressive form of rational basis scrutiny to strike down a law targeting a
particular group and only later re-characterizing the earlier decision as having
in fact applied intermediate or strict scrutiny. The Court followed this trajectory
with respect to laws targeting African-Americans, women, and non-marital
children.22 Since announcing a suspect or quasi-suspect classification is strong
judicial medicine and effectively decides most or all future laws impacting a
given group, the Court understandably treads carefully before making such a
declaration.23 Thus, for example, the Court struck down laws denying African
Americans equal access to educational opportunities without declaring those
laws subject to strict scrutiny because it wished to avoid deciding the
constitutionality of miscegenation laws before the Court was ready to take on
that controversy.24
Yet, even accounting for the Court’s need to proceed with caution, the lag
period with respect to sexual orientation is excessive compared to other
historically disadvantaged groups. Had Justice Kennedy declared sexual
orientation discrimination a suspect or quasi-suspect classification in
Obergefell and re-characterized the Court’s decisions in Romer, Lawrence, and
Windsor as applying such scrutiny, that would have culminated a nineteen-year
period, assuring the Court of the soundness of the new suspect classification.
Historically, the lag between these two events—the first vindicating the equal
protection rights of a targeted group under purported rational basis scrutiny and
the second applying intermediate or strict scrutiny—has been no greater than
nineteen years and often far shorter.
For example, the Court first invoked the Equal Protection Clause in the
modern era25 to strike down laws targeting African Americans in 1954 in
20. Id. at 2597–2604.
21. 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing appeal on grounds that prohibition of same-sex marriage
under Minnesota statute did not raise a substantial federal question).
22. See infra notes 25–36.
23. See EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND
THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 32–37, 74 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999).
24. See id. at 36.
25. I am here discounting Strauder v. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (striking down a West
Virginia statute that discriminated in jury selection against African Americans on account of race and
holding that it denied equal protection to an African-American defendant), and other cases preceding
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), because Plessy kicked off a new era in equal protection
jurisprudence in which African Americans were effectively unprotected by the Clause. I am also here
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Brown v. Board of Education,26 and a decade later in McLaughlin v. Florida,27
the Court re-characterized that case as applying strict scrutiny.28 This in turn
paved the way for the Court’s invalidation of miscegenation laws thirteen years
after Brown in Loving v. Virginia.29 Similarly, the Court first invoked the Equal
Protection Clause to strike down a law discriminating on the basis of sex in
1971,30 a plurality of the Court re-characterized that case as applying strict
scrutiny two years later,31 and, by 1976, a majority of the Court coalesced
around intermediate scrutiny for sex-based classifications.32 Finally, the Court
first invoked the Equal Protection Clause to strike down a law discriminating
on the basis of legitimacy in 1968,33 and by 1976, appeared to acknowledge
something more robust than rational basis review but something less than strict
scrutiny.34 By 1988, the Court had formally coalesced around intermediate
scrutiny for legitimacy-based classifications.35 Thus, if the Court ever decides
to declare sexual orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect classification in the
future, gays and lesbians will have experienced the longest lag time of any
group.
Justice Kennedy’s refusal to declare sexual orientation a suspect
classification in Obergefell is all the more surprising given the relatively low
stakes of such an announcement. When the Court held that laws targeting
African Americans were subject to strict scrutiny in McLaughlin, it effectively
decided the constitutionality of interracial marriage, one of the most highly
contested social matters of the time.36 Obergefell itself directly decided samesex marriage, the most socially sensitive gay rights issue of this time.37 While
other laws, such as parentage rights, targeting gays and lesbians have yet to be
adjudicated by the Court, such laws do not raise issues nearly as socially
sensitive as marriage—the lightning rod that generated constitutional
discounting cases like Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), which found in favor of the AfricanAmerican plaintiff but did not challenge the constitutionality of Plessy’s underlying separate-but-equal
scheme.
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
28. Id. at 192.
29. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
30. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
31. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88 (1973) (plurality opinion).
32. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
33. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
34. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504–06, 509–10 (1976). The Court did not create the
intermediate scrutiny standard until the following Term. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; id. at 218
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
36. See Kenji Yoshino, The Paradox of Political Power: Same-Sex Marriage and the Supreme
Court, 2 UTAH L. REV. 527, 540 (2012).
37. See Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP.COM (poll showing greater public opposition to
same-sex marriage than to other gay rights issues, such as same-sex adoption or employment
discrimination) (visited Oct. 26, 2015) http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx
[http://perma.cc/U74L-KV53].
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amendments banning the practice in a supermajority of states.38 Accordingly,
announcing heightened scrutiny in Obergefell would not have come close to
the strong medicine that it would have been had the Court announced it earlier
in Romer or Lawrence, for example.
The Court’s failure to declare sexual orientation a suspect classification
has resulted in concrete harm to gays and lesbians. Despite precedents like
Romer and Lawrence, lower courts have repeatedly upheld laws discriminating
on the basis of sexual orientation, such as the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
policy39 and laws prohibiting gays and lesbians from adopting,40 reasoning that
only rational basis review applies and that the laws satisfy that deferential level
of review. Moreover, numerous pre-Windsor courts upheld laws refusing to
permit or recognize same-sex marriage, applying no more than rational basis
scrutiny because Romer and Lawrence did not announce a higher standard.41
The guarded nature of Justice Kennedy’s opinions have not been without cost.
Moreover, the failure to declare sexual orientation a suspect classification
creates future harm—in the form of continued legal uncertainty for gays and
lesbians. Consider first current or future laws restricting the ability of gays and
lesbians to legally adopt children. Because Obergefell was laser focused on the
fundamental right to marry and not the nature of the classification, and because
the Court noted, without casting doubt on its constitutionality, that some states
do not permit gays and lesbians to adopt children,42 future courts can easily
distinguish Obergefell. Consider, as a second example, the use of peremptory
challenges to strike jurors. Where a peremptory challenge implicates a suspect
or quasi-suspect classification, such as race or sex, the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits the exercise of that challenge on that ground. Such a protection does
not apply to non-suspect grounds.43 Thus, it is only if heightened scrutiny
applies to sexual orientation that litigants may prevent opposing counsel from
striking people from juries solely on the basis of their sexual orientation.44
Perhaps one way to defend Justice Kennedy is to view his approach as
that of a cautious judicial minimalist, eschewing the broad implications of a
holding that would declare sexual orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification. Such a minimalist approach would certainly justify a decision
like Romer. But judicial minimalism is hardly furthered by decisions like
Lawrence and Obergefell, which avoid a class-based equal protection decision

38. See Jonathan Rauch, Red Families, Blue Families, Gay Families, and the Search for a
New Normal, 28 LAW & INEQ. 333, 334 (2010).
39. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 60–62 (1st Cir. 1998).
40. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–18,
826–27 (11th Cir. 2004).
41. See, e.g., In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Andersen v. King Cnty.,
138 P.3d 963, 974–76 (Wash. 2006).
42. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
43. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143–45 (1994).
44. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 479–81 (9th Cir. 2014).
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by instead striking down laws on the ground that they infringe on fundamental
rights. As between the two bases for decision, class-based equal protection
decisions are more consistent with judicial minimalism.
Although a class-based equal protection decision in Lawrence or
Obergefell would at first seem to represent a broad approach because it would
apply across the board to any law discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation, it is narrower than the fundamental rights approach in several
ways. First, a class-based equal protection decision would only apply to laws
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, not other classifications.
Thus, for example, in the realm of marriage, a class-based equal protection
decision would only apply to laws prohibiting same-sex (or opposite-sex)
marriage. In contrast, Obergefell’s sweeping fundamental rights language
opens the door to marriage claims by others, including those seeking plural
marriage, cousin marriage, or marriage between underage persons. Having
declared the right fundamental rather than the classification suspect, states
must defend all restrictions on the right. Second, by declaring something a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, the Court takes away the
states’ power to simply eliminate the right altogether by treating everyone
even-handedly.45 These characteristics make due process the stronger medicine
and equal protection the minimalist approach. Take Lawrence as an example.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion eschewed a class-based equal protection
approach because it would lead some to “question whether a prohibition would
be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between samesex and different-sex participants.”46 This is the exact opposite of the
minimalist approach taken by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence, which left
that possibility open but instead struck down the law on equal protection
grounds.47 For these reasons, a penchant for judicial minimalism cannot justify
Justice Kennedy’s approach in the gay rights cases.
Justice Kennedy may well have an altogether different view of the proper
role of the Equal Protection Clause, preferring an approach that is rightsfocused rather than class-focused and moving away from the rigid tiered
approach in favor of a more unitary approach. Yet his approach lacks the
transparency that comes with announcing a classification to be suspect or
quasi-suspect. That lack of transparency both leaves the Court’s decisions
vulnerable to criticism as ipse dixit of the sort employed by the Court in
Lochner v. New York48—as the Chief Justice contended in his Obergefell
45. See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due process grounds leaves ungoverned and
ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable. Invocation of the equal protection
clause, on the other hand, does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at
hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact.”).
46. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
47. Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
48. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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dissent49—and denies litigants and lower courts the guidance they need to
apply the constitutional principle consistently in future cases.50 For this reason,
Obergefell and its antecedents represent a somewhat unstable foundation upon
which to build future gay rights victories.

49. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
50. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 459–60 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[B]y failing to articulate the factors that justify today’s
‘second order’ rational-basis review, the Court provides no principled foundation for determining
when more searching inquiry is to be invoked.”).

